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The Rain Man Cometh - Again
Abstract
For colleges and universities October has traditionally been a tough month — growing darkness, impending
rain and cold, the creeping realization that the football team won't win that many games. Not so long ago,
October was also the month of reckoning for higher education: On October 16, 1983, U.S. News and World
Report published its first rankings of institutions. Under the soft-sell headline "America's Best Colleges" and in
the breathless prose of a Sunday supplement, U.S. News offered up a collegiate roster of who was in, who was
out, who was hot, and who was not.
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E X C H A N G E
The Rain Man Cometh—Again
by Robert Zemsky
For colleges and universities October has tradi-tionally been a tough month—growing dark-ness, impending rain and cold, the creeping
realization that the football team won’t win that
many games. Not so long ago, October was also
the month of reckoning for higher education: On
October 16, 1983, U.S. News and World Report
published its first rankings of institutions. Under
the soft-sell headline “America’s Best Colleges”
and in the breathless prose of a Sunday supple-
ment, U.S. News offered up a collegiate roster of
who was in, who was out, who was hot, and who
was not.
ATruePhenom
In 2007 the U.S. News rankings celebrated their25th anniversary, having become an Americanicon. They’ve also spawned a veritable tribe of
rankings telling Americans about the best law
schools and graduate schools and medical schools
and more.
Not surprisingly, the rankings have become the
subject of extended analyses, most of which are
designed either to discredit them or to discover
what they truly measure. As every right-thinking
academic knows, the rankings cannot possibly
measure what they propose to measure—that im-
measurable quantity: academic quality. In the
winter of 1990 Bill Massy and I joined the growing
discourse on the rankings with our article “The
Rain Man Cometh” (Zemsky & Massy, 1990).
Then, as now, there were three basic ways to
attack the rankings.
The first, and easiest, was to point out that the
rankings were silly: arithmetically precise but
largely without meaning. U.S. News had started
with a clever idea: Ask college and university
presidents to list what they thought were the best
institutions for an undergraduate education. Even
if the results of what became known as the “beauty
contest” reflected a bias in the magazine’s choice
of presidents, most knowledgeable observers were
intrigued by the outcome. Despite some notable as
well as curious omissions, few readers doubted that
those at the top of the presidents’ list belonged
there. It may have been gossip, but it was good
gossip that sold a lot of magazines.
The problem was that the losers in these early
polls wouldn’t accept the results. With unex-
pected force—after all, U.S. News and World Re-
port was not a particularly important magazine—
those slighted by the poll argued that the rankings
were too simplistic, too much a product of fading
reputations and old-school networks. U.S. News’
response was to get scientific. Starting in 1989 the
annual rankings issue included, in addition to the
results of the “beauty contest,” a variety of statis-
tics the editors presented as objective measures of
institutional quality. Most of the measures re-
flected educational inputs rather than outputs.
How selective was the institution? What was the
average SAT/ACT of the freshman class? What
was the student/faculty ratio? How much money
did the institution spend on undergraduate edu-
cation? Not surprisingly, many within and a few
outside of higher education asked what had hap-
pened to that old-fashioned notion that quality in
education meant good teaching, engaged faculty,
and industrious students.
There were also problems with the statistics
themselves. Some numbers, it turned out, counted
for more than others, though the reader was never
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told exactly how much more or why. Some insti-
tutional resources were counted twice, first as rev-
enue and then as expense. Some revenues did not
count at all in the U.S. News formula—tuition,
for example, and federal research funds.
The titles of categories did not mean what they
seemed. The category “faculty reputation” was not
about faculty standing but rather faculty-student
ratios. Initially, at least, transcription and data
errors abounded. Vassar College complained to
the magazine that a simple data-entry error cost it
four places in the rankings. Obvious errors origi-
nating in an institution’s federal Integrated Post-
secondary Education Data System (IPEDS) report,
which U.S. News used to construct the rankings,
were allowed to stand without further checking.
What’s more, in the beginning there was appar-
ently little or no checking of the admissions data
submitted by institutions, though in recent years
U.S. News has both checked and deducted pen-
alty points when its algorithms detected an im-
plausible submission.
Like the calculations of the autistic savant Dus-
tin Hoffman played in Rain Man, the movie from
which Bill and I borrowed the title for our cri-
tique, the rankings were invested with arithmetic
precision, but the numbers themselves were
largely devoid of meaning.
The second way to attack the rankings was to
declare them wrongheaded, having confused ends
with means. The editors responsible for the rank-
ings issues seemingly did not understand what
their statistical staff and consultants were do-
ing—or why. In our critique, Bill and I focused on
the essay that ran as the forward to the 1989 issue.
It was a sensible, at times eloquent statement of
the need for a new sense of financial limits in
higher education. To make our point we quoted
the editors’ declaration that “In the end bidding
for limited resources will intensify, and colleges
will have to make ever more Draconian decisions
about what is truly essential to their mission”
(Zemsky & Massy, 1990, p. 22).
It would have been difficult, but not impossi-
ble, for the rankings to reflect this new sense of
limits, rewarding those institutions that had dem-
onstrated their quality and efficiency by in fact
doing more with less. Instead, the numbers em-
bedded in the ranking methodology rewarded
profligacy.
The financial information used in the analysis
did not reflect efficient expenditures, but rather
gross revenues. To make our point we used the
case of Carleton College in Minnesota. The col-
lege had participated in our study of the cost of an
undergraduate education, and we had come away
with an appreciation of Carleton’s efficiency, the
work ethic of its faculty, and the structure and
leanness of its curriculum. We were not alone in
our admiration.
In the “beauty contest” section of the rankings
issue, Carleton placed sixth among national lib-
eral arts colleges. In overall ranking, however, the
college was only 14th. Why? Because the college
ranked 41st in faculty quality (a slightly higher
faculty-student ratio than most of its peers) and
26th in financial resources (a slightly lower en-
dowment income and almost no public appropri-
ation). How, we asked, could “a college judged to
have a ‘statistically’ mediocre faculty in fact have
a national reputation that puts it among the top
10 liberal arts colleges year after year?” The answer
was simple. The measures were nonsensical.
The third, and by now the most damning,
attack on the rankings held that the exercise itself
was inherently dangerous. The rankings have be-
come the scorecard of an admissions arms race
that has encouraged a spiraling competition for
students and faculty that, over the last 25 years,
has dramatically escalated the cost of an under-
graduate education. I sat in horror one afternoon
at a meeting of the board of trustees of a nationally
ranked liberal arts college as its members berated
the president because the college had once again
failed to crack the top 25 national liberal arts
colleges—a category that makes up half of the
“nifty fifty” that are featured each year in the U.S.
News annual rankings issue. On this day the pres-
ident had had enough. Forgetting who and where
he was, he snapped. In a voice barely distinguished
from a snarl he responded, “You let me run a
hundred million-dollar deficit and I will guarantee
you a top-10 finish!” He was wrong, of course. It
probably would have taken little more than an
annual increase of expenditures in the $10 million
to $15 million range.
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There was, we pointed out in our original “The
Rain Man Cometh” article, a secondary danger as
well. More than one member of the board of
trustees, we suggested, would likely be tempted to
take charge of the problem him or herself. Draw-
ing on their business experiences, particularly
their successes at having their own companies
included among “America’s Best Corporations,”
some trustees and regents would likely argue for an
immediate investment in creative public relations.
The result would be more business for high-priced
consultants who promised to polish the institu-
tion’s image.
And that is pretty much what has happened.
Getting an institution’s annual submission to
U.S. News ready has become “presidential busi-
ness.” With so much at stake the president wants
to make sure the numbers submitted allow the
institution to put its best foot forward. Presidents
are ever watchful for the opportunity to tout the
excellence of their institutions—and if those op-
portunities coincide with the distribution of the
institutional rating forms, so much the better.
Talk about the rankings and the importance of
becoming a top-ranked institution now permeates
an ever-increasing number of strategic plans along
with promises to be increasingly student-centered
and civically engaged.
Colin Diver, former dean of the law school at
the University of Pennsylvania and now the pres-
ident of Reed College, summed up this aspect of
the problem in 2005 in The Atlantic. Diver, an
educational insider who by his own testimony
now feels liberated from the rankings madness,
restated Reed’s policy of not cooperating with the
rankings and in the process summed up what
many believe but only few act upon:
A somewhat more important consequence of Reed’s re-
bellious stance is the freedom from temptation to game the
ratings formula (or, assuming that we would resist that
temptation, from the nagging suspicion that we were
competing in a rigged competition). Since the mid-1990s
numerous stories in the popular press have documented
how various schools distort their standard operating pro-
cedures, creatively interpret survey instructions, or boldly
misreport information in order to raise their rankings. . . .
I was struck . . . in reading a recent New York Times
article, by how the art of gaming has evolved in my former
world of legal education, where ranking pressure is par-
ticularly intense. The Times reported that some law
schools inflate their graduate-employment rates by hiring
unemployed graduates for “short-term legal research po-
sitions.” Some law schools have found that they can raise
their “student selectivity” (based in part on LSAT scores
and GPAs for entering students) by admitting fewer
full-time first-year students and more part-time and trans-
fer students (two categories for which data do not have to
be reported). At least one creative law school reportedly
inflated its “expenditures per student” by using an im-
puted “fair market value,” rather than the actual rate, to
calculate the cost of computerized research services (pro-
vided by LexisNexis and Westlaw). The “fair market
value” (which a law firm would have paid) differed from
what the law school actually paid (at the providers’ edu-
cational rate) by a factor of eighty!
He then drives the point home by quoting a
presidential colleague who, when asked why he
didn’t refuse to participate in the U.S. News pro-
cess, responded, “The rankings are merely intol-
erable; unilateral disarmament is suicide” (Diver,
2005).
Diver’s critique reflects the often private anger
of presidents who feel helpless to do anything but
play the game. More recently, however, a number
of presidents, most of whom head schools that are
members of the Annapolis Group of 34 private
liberal arts colleges, have started taking on the
rankings on educational grounds. Often their
spokesman is Lloyd Thacker, a former admissions
counselor who has seen the light. What alarms
Thacker and those for whom he speaks is that the
rankings have so corrupted the college choice
process that students, particularly the best, bright-
est, and most affluent, make decisions that are all
but devoid of educational content and value. Stu-
dents don’t ask the right questions and don’t draw
the right conclusions, having bought the implica-
tion of the rankings that somewhere out there is
the very best college for them. The reality, as most
presidents know—though in their public pro-
nouncements they often deny—is that most col-
leges competing for the same students are pretty
much the same—or as Larry Litten, an institu-
tional researcher for some of the U.S.’s best and
priciest colleges and now a consultant to Thack-
er’s Educational Conservancy, told a meeting of
anti-ranking activists called by Thacker:
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The message that needs to be delivered by colleges (both
by what they say and how they market, recruit, and
admit) is that most institutions seek similar goals, at least
within broad groupings of institutions with similar re-
sources and programs, and that each institution is suffi-
ciently complex so that a given student can find a situation
that is comfortably challenging and rewarding. As long as
individual institutions are implying otherwise in their own
marketing and competitive behavior, however, students
will turn to the mechanism that most efficiently and
plausibly differentiates and ranks institutions (Educa-
tional Conservancy, 2007).
The ultimate danger inherent in any ranking
scheme is that by enshrining the language of com-
petition and uniqueness the rankings themselves
corrupt both student and college. The former ar-
rives for his or her freshman year with the wrong
expectations. The latter engages in a process that
devalues education. Nobody wins in the rankings
game.
TheFlip Side
Not everyone and certainly not every presidentof an American college or university wouldagree. Competition is not necessarily bad,
and, in some cases, it has actually proved benefi-
cial. When Judith Rodin became president of the
University of Pennsylvania in 1993 she found an
institution that had grown progressively stronger
without ever quite losing its inferiority complex.
Indeed, that internal sense of not being quite as
good as its competition had already led Penn in
the 1920s and then again in the 1950s to com-
mission an educational survey designed to help
the university understand its place within Amer-
ican higher education. Each exercise yielded
roughly the same result: Penn, when all its
strengths and weaknesses were taken into ac-
count, ranked about 15th among the nation’s
principal universities. Not coincidentally, 15th is
about where Penn consistently placed in the U.S.
News rankings prior to Rodin’s arrival.
Rodin wanted Penn’s strengths to be recog-
nized and celebrated both within and without the
university. Her message to her deans, including
Colin Diver, was simple. She expected them to
secure for their schools a top-10 ranking. She did
not care which rankings were used as long as they
were comprehensive and garnered wide attention.
She did not insist that each school use the U.S.
News ranking, but absent another recommenda-
tion, that is the ranking she would pay attention
to.
The results were spectacular. Penn rose in the
overall rankings to achieve top-10 and occasion-
ally top-five status among national research uni-
versities. Its professional schools—Wharton,
Medicine, Law, even Nursing and Education—
solidified their positions as top-10 institutions.
Were the rankings directly responsible for these
schools’ or the university’s achievements writ
large? Of course not—but the presence of the
rankings and the fact that the president took them
seriously certainly helped focus people’s attention.
Northeastern University presents an even more
dramatic example of how paying attention to the
rankings was essential for institutions seeking to
reposition themselves in an increasingly compet-
itive market for students, faculty, and research
dollars. In the 1980s Northeastern had floun-
dered. Once a blue-collar university whose co-op
programs had particular appeal for Boston’s work-
ing-class students, Northeastern was losing pro-
spective full- and part-time students to a newly
invigorated and very public University of Massa-
chusetts system. The university’s first response was
to expand its offerings, making up in volume what
it was necessarily losing in price as it tried to at
least come close to matching UMass-Boston’s
lower tuition. When that strategy failed, North-
eastern underwent a dramatic downsizing, shed-
ding programs, faculty, and staff and betting on its
ability to reposition itself as a selective institution
worth the higher price it found itself charging out
of necessity.
The president who steered Northeastern
through the shoals of repositioning was Richard
Freeland, something of a surprise choice who
nonetheless had a remarkably sure-footed instinct
for what had to be done. The challenge facing
Northeastern, he said not just once but over and
over again, was to become a top-100 university.
At that moment Northeastern was ranked 162nd.
Freeland believed that the rankings methodology
actually told him and his colleagues what they had
to do: improve selectivity, improve retention, in-
crease the proportion of students graduating
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within six years, garner more sponsored research,
and increase Northeastern’s media visibility. At
the same time, Freeland believed that focusing on
the rankings would animate the Northeastern
community. To track progress he established an
annual scorecard with specific targets to be met
each year in each of these categories. And year by
year and inch by inch Northeastern improved its
metrics—and each year that progress culminated
in a higher U.S. News ranking. In the year Free-
land stepped down as president, Northeastern
ranked 98th among national research universities.
Was Northeastern really that much better a
university? Most would agree that it was and, more
important, that it was worth the increased tuition
it now charged. Were the rankings really that
important an element in Freeland’s march to re-
position Northeastern? Skeptics point out that
what really transformed Northeastern was the
trustees’ willingness to authorize more than $400
million in construction debt that allowed the uni-
versity to become a more residential as well as a
more attractive campus. But as in Penn’s case,
Freeland’s scorecard focused the campus’s atten-
tion on what the rankings measured. The naysay-
ers—and there were some who decried Northeast-
ern’s abandoning its traditional mission to become
a BU look-alike—never had a chance as long as
the rankings improved and Northeastern looked
both more solid and more successful.
In theEyeof theBeholder
The differences in perspective between Thacker,Litten, and the liberal arts presidents whochampion the Educational Conservancy on
the one hand and presidents like Rodin and Free-
land who have used the rankings to move their
institutions up the rankings ladder on the other
are important for what they reveal about the kind
of strategies each group wants higher education to
pursue. The former see in the rankings a world in
which competition and conflict have replaced
collaboration and cooperation. Because rankings
reward the wrong behavior they diminish the im-
portance as well as the uniqueness of the Ameri-
can educational experience. The latter group is
much more accepting of competition as a way of
life in a market economy. If handled right, com-
petition brings out the best in people and makes
them reach inside themselves to do better. In
other words, only by asking “how is the other guy
doing?” can an institution know for sure that it is
making the most of its assets and opportunities.
These differences in perspective also highlight
the importance of determining just exactly what
the rankings measure. It is a question we—and
here I include my colleagues at Penn’s Institute for
Research on Higher Education, Susan Shaman
and Dan Shapiro—stumbled into when working
as part of the National Center for Postsecondary
Improvement (NCPI) based at Stanford. As be-
fore, we were interested in the structure of the
market for undergraduate education, only this
time we wanted to build a model that explained
the various prices charged by institutions. The
result was a market taxonomy—many remember
its initial publication that used a paper-airplane–
like sketch—that distributed colleges and univer-
sities across a continuum that began at one end
with the high-priced, highly selective institutions
and ended at the other with institutions designed
for students more likely to earn their higher edu-
cations by taking one course at a time—often
from several institutions. The former we dubbed
“medallion” institutions; the latter we labeled “us-
er-friendly or convenience” institutions; in be-
tween were “name-brand,” “good-opportunity,”
and “good-buy” institutions (National Center for
Postsecondary Improvement, 1997).
What we liked about the taxonomy was on the
one hand, its ability to actually predict the prices
institutions charged, and on the other, its link to
commonsense definitions of market attractive-
ness. One of the parlor games we liked to play was
to ask a group of educators to list, preferably in
rank order, the two dozen or so “medallion” insti-
tutions that resided at the top of the market. It
was a test almost no one failed.
The statistical model underlying our market
taxonomy had the additional advantage of being
remarkably simple. Just five variables were needed
to predict price: the percentage of an institution’s
freshman class that graduated with a baccalaureate
degree within six years of initial enrollment; the
proportion of applicants an institution admitted
and the proportion of those admitted applicants
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who actually enrolled; the geographic region of
the country in which the institution was located;
and whether it was a public or private institution.
The most powerful variable was the six-year grad-
uation rate. Probably the best explanation of what
made that variable so important in predicting
what price an institution could charge was offered
by a graduate student at the University of Penn-
sylvania who, in a previous life, had been a Wall
Street trader. “Think how the best fund traders
hedge their bets,” he told us. The extra tuition a
medallion can charge was a premium against the
risk of not graduating and thus losing the value of
the money the student had already invested. The
fact that the country’s most selective students
were attracted to as well as sought out by these
medallions made enrollment there that much
more of a bargain.
Inevitably, we were asked how well our market
taxonomy tracked with the U.S. News rankings.
The answer, we quickly learned, was unnervingly
well. Both the market taxonomy and the U.S.
News rankings produced roughly the same list in
roughly the same order. But then again, we should
not have been surprised, since both analyses use
the six-year graduation rate as a key variable.
What did surprise us, however, was the fact that
we could largely replicate the U.S. News list using
just two variables from the magazine: six-year
graduation rate and score on the reputation sur-
vey. Among the 50 top liberal arts colleges the fit
was almost perfect. Research universities pre-
sented a slightly more complex result, since the
U.S. News list commingled public and private
institutions. Once a research university’s con-
trol—either public or private—was taken into
account, the result nearly matched that of the
liberal arts colleges.
We now had our answer. The U.S. News rank-
ings measure not quality—a conceit only U.S.
News itself still promotes—but market position.
Once that proposition is understood it becomes
perfectly clear why presidents like Rodin and Free-
land are attracted to the rankings. Both made
improving their institutions’ market position the
focus of their presidencies. At the same time, the
fact that the U.S. News rankings measure market
position and not much else helps explain the
growing discomfort of educational reformers in
general—and liberal arts college presidents in par-
ticular—who want to de-escalate institutional
competition by instead stressing the importance of
educational values and institutional collabora-
tions.
Customer Satisfaction
U .S. News is not alone in seeking to rankAmerican colleges and universities in orderto determine who is best. The University of
Illinois-Chicago maintains a rankings Web site
that contains thumbnail sketches of two dozen
separate ranking schemes. In addition to the U.S.
News rankings, the Web site lists entries that vary
from “Young America’s Foundation Top Ten
Conservative Colleges” to “New Mobility Disabil-
ity-Friendly Colleges” to “John Templeton Foun-
dation: Colleges That Encourage Character De-
velopment.”
Most of these other ranking schemes use meth-
odologies roughly similar to U.S. News’s collec-
tion of statistical variables, which are indexed to
produce a rank ordering. The most important ex-
ception to this pattern is the rankings of MBA
business schools conducted by BusinessWeek.
Starting in 1988 BusinessWeek began an every-
other-year look at what it called the “Best B-
schools.” Instead of compiling a statistical portrait
of the schools, however, the magazine chose in-
stead to “ask the customer”—or, in this case, the
two sets of customers most important to business
schools: their students and the corporate recruiters
who do the interviewing and the hiring. What the
BusinessWeek rankings measure, the magazine
proudly tells its readers, is nothing less than “cus-
tomer satisfaction.”
For its 2006 ranking of B-schools BusinessWeek
contacted 16,565 recent graduates of the top 100
business schools. In all 9,298 responded, for a
more than respectable 56% response rate. Only
two schools refused to supply the names and ad-
dresses of their recent graduates: the Harvard
Business School and the University of Pennsylva-
nia’s Wharton School. Using public records Busi-
nessWeek tracked down and got responses back
from 39% of the recalcitrant institutions’ recent
graduates. In the final result, Wharton ranked
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second and Harvard fourth; the first and third
spots went to the University of Chicago Graduate
School of Management and Northwestern Uni-
versity’s Kellogg School, respectively.
The survey itself was a 50-item questionnaire
that asked about everything from what the grad-
uates thought of the teaching at their schools to
the kinds of career services the school provided to
their initial salary upon graduation with an MBA.
BusinessWeek went to considerable lengths to fer-
ret out the possibility that the schools were trying
to game the survey by hiring two CUNY educa-
tional psychologists to test the probability that
individual institutions were coaching their stu-
dents to ensure the best possible responses. In the
final rankings, a school’s score on the student
survey received a 45% weight in the final rank-
ings. Also receiving a 45% weight was each
school’s score on the corporate recruiter survey.
Recruiters were asked to judge the quality of the
students they interviewed for employment in
terms of their communication skills, aptitude for
teamwork, and analytic skills. Beginning in 2006
BusinessWeek began using a weighted average of
the recruiter survey that included the current plus
the previous two survey administrations in order
to provide a more robust and stable total score.
The final 10% of a school’s score reflected what
BusinessWeek called “intellectual capital.” For this
index the magazine focused on the school’s fac-
ulty, noting their publications in the field’s top 20
publications, from the Journal of Accounting Re-
search to the Harvard Business Review. Business-
Week also searched the New York Times, the Wall
Street Journal, and its own archives, adding points
if a professor’s book was reviewed there. The
scores were then adjusted for faculty size.
What the BusinessWeek rankings promise and
deliver is an ordering of business schools based on
the outcomes that matter most to students (aver-
age salary after graduation, career support, en-
gaged teaching) and to the companies that hire
them (capacity to communicate, analyze, and be
an effective team member).
What the BusinessWeek rankings also provide
first and foremost is a diagnostic tool that tells the
aspiring institution what it has to do to rise in the
rankings. The folklore that surrounds the compet-
itive world of B-school rankings abounds in stories
of institutions caught short and their subsequent
scramble to set things right. My favorite centers
on a top-10 business school that suddenly plum-
meted in the rankings in large part because it had
angered its student body. In the midst of the
ensuing furor the school went about the business
of recruiting a new dean. One candidate arrived
with a detailed analysis of the BusinessWeek rank-
ings, telling the interview committee what the
school needed to do to right itself. When the
candidate sensed no one was really interested, he
withdrew his candidacy. The school has yet to
return to the top 10.
Purposes
Actually, the BusinessWeek rankings serve bothof the principal purposes of educational rank-ings. On the one hand, the rankings provide,
as the magazine proclaims, an important measure
of “customer satisfaction.” In the hands of an
adroit dean, the rankings are a guide to quality
improvement because they highlight both the suc-
cesses and the failures that matter most to students
and employers. At the same time, the rankings
clearly signal market position—those at the top
have the same market power among B-schools
that the colleges and universities at the top of the
U.S. News rankings of undergraduate institutions
have in that domain. And no one seems too
worried about the very public nature of the exer-
cise itself. Given the institutions’ educational
commitment to competition and market forces,
one should expect that judgments of quality and
market position should be both public and entan-
gled.
For undergraduate education this commingling
of quality improvement and public measurement
presents a host of difficulties—just ask the aca-
demics and institutional leaders responsible for
the National Survey of Student Engagement. The
NSSE, as it is fondly known, was the brainchild of
Russ Edgerton, who was first the president of the
American Association of Higher Education
(AAHE) and later the educational director of the
Pew Charitable Trust, which provided NSSE’s
start-up funds. His collaborator was Peter Ewell,
who over the last two decades has solidified his
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position as the researcher who best understands
learning outcomes and how they are achieved.
Together, Edgerton and Ewell argued that while it
was not really possible to test for learning out-
comes, it was possible to test for the conditions
that promoted the best learning—what they came
to summarize as the conditions promoting student
engagement.
The NSSE itself is a four-page survey given to
a sampling of college and university juniors and
seniors that asks questions about what they typi-
cally do both in and out of class, how much they
study, how often they write papers, how often they
engage in collaborative learning projects, and how
many hours per week they work for pay. Toward
the end of the instrument the student is asked to
evaluate the “quality of your relationships with
people at your institution” (i.e., other students,
faculty, and administrative personnel). The stu-
dent is given a seven-point scale for each group,
ranging from “unfriendly, unsupportive, sense of
alienation” to “friendly, supportive, sense of be-
longing” for fellow students; from “unavailable,
unhelpful, unsympathetic” to “available, helpful,
sympathetic” for faculty; and from “unhelpful, in-
considerate, rigid” to “helpful, considerate, flexi-
ble” for administrative personnel.
The NSSE has been wildly successful, particu-
larly among public institutions and lesser-ranked
private colleges and universities. To date, more
than 1,200 baccalaureate institutions have admin-
istered the NSSE to a sample of their students—
and many repeat the survey on an every-other or
every-third-year cycle. What the NSSE has pro-
vided these institutions is a clear sense of what
they need to improve specific to student engage-
ment and, by implication at least, learning out-
comes. Faculties have been put on notice when
the NSSE shows they have not been attentive
enough. Curriculum committees have taken note
when the NSSE reports that, compared to similar
institutions, students on the committee’s campus
do not write enough or do not speak up in class
regularly or do not engage in collaborative learn-
ing projects on a regular basis.
True, NSSE institutions have been known to
festoon their Web sites with NSSE factoids like
“we rank in the 90th percentile” on particular
survey items. For the most part, however, the
NSSE is advertised as and used for purposes of
improvement, though from the outset Edgerton,
in particular, believed that in time colleges and
universities would grow comfortable with having
their NSSE results in the public domain as a kind
of natural antidote to the U.S. News rankings.
Most institutions, however, have demurred, want-
ing to contemplate their results in private.
Last year the NSSE organization joined with
USA Today to launch an “Initiative to Focus on
Meaningful Indicators of Collegiate Quality,” an
effort that promised to publish better measures of
institutional quality. But for the moment, only the
good results will be presented in USA Today,
those that highlight what the partners described as
“different types of colleges and universities that
involve their students at high levels in effective
educational practices.”
Critics and observers who want higher educa-
tion to be more accountable want the NSSE re-
sults released—and there’s the rub. Will institu-
tions still use the NSSE if the results are made
public and used for the purpose of holding them
accountable to their accreditors and, in the case of
public institutions, their state regulatory agencies?
Won’t the temptation be, as Colin Diver has
suggested is already the case with the U.S. News
rankings, to “game” the system by lessening the
probability that unhappy or disengaged students
make it into the test’s sample? Won’t institutions,
subtly or not, encourage those students selected to
fill out the NSSE to “win one for the Gipper” by
focusing on what is right as opposed to what is
wrong with the institution?
Even tougher to gauge is the reaction of the
faculty. Already there is a tendency for the very
best or at least the top-rated and most expensive
undergraduate institutions not to use the NSSE,
sensing that they have little to learn and a fair
amount to lose. If the past is any guide, faculty will
find it in their interest to attack the instrument
itself, bringing all their considerable verbal and
mathematical firepower to bear to demonstrate
that NSSE results are at best inconclusive. What
had hitherto been seen as an interesting diagnos-
tic tool, no doubt with some methodological prob-
lems, may become in the eyes of many a political
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tool of uncertain value that will likely be used to
bludgeon otherwise right-thinking faculty into
adopting cookie-cutter approaches to undergradu-
ate education.
That is already the fate befalling another in-
strument that seeks to measure learning outcomes.
The Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) was
originally developed by researchers at the RAND
Corporation and then later spun off to something
called the Council for Aid to Education. The
CLA is a Web-based instrument that tests samples
of an institution’s students in four broad areas:
critical thinking, analytic reasoning, written com-
munication, and problem solving. While the test
itself is automated, its grading is not and depends
on the ability of the test givers to train a sufficient
number of graders.
Presumptive regulators, in particular, have
been much impressed with the CLA. Charles
Miller, the chair of the Spellings Commission,1
early on urged his commission to adopt the CLA
as exactly the kind of test that would tell the
nation which colleges were up to the mark and
which were not. From Miller’s perspective, the
CLA offered precisely the objective measure that
would allow everyone—government funders and
regulators, accreditors, and potential students and
their parents—to at last hold higher education
accountable. The CLA would be to higher edu-
cation what the battery of No Child Left Behind
tests are to primary and secondary education.
The problem is that the CLA won’t do. It is
expensive to administer. Its results are difficult to
interpret and verify. It largely tests general educa-
tion rather than the kind of advanced and tech-
nical knowledge that forms the basis for most
collegiate majors. At least in the pilot tests made
public so far, there has been an uncomfortable
correlation between SAT/ACT results and the
CLA—hence, the institutions with the most se-
lective admissions practices are very likely to be
the ones that score highest on the CLA. The
Council for Aid to Education counters that the
CLA really allows the measurement of value add-
ed—that is, how much more the student knows
upon leaving college—using the students’ high
school SAT/ACT results as the benchmark. But
here too the results have been confusing, leading
institutions to ask which is the better measure, the
SAT/ACT or the CLA?
Actually, there is a prior technical difficulty
that renders the CLA less than ideal. While the
CLA results are to be used to evaluate an institu-
tion and its learning effectiveness, students take
the test. Since they have no personal interest in
the outcome—their scores, for example, will not
be reported to prospective graduate schools or
employers—they are not likely to prepare for the
test or necessarily do their very best. Faculty are
quick to point out that they have little intention
of being judged by student performances on a test
that does not matter to the student. My guess is
that given the choice, faculty would prefer an
old-fashioned beauty contest survey or even the
NSSE to the CLA.
Moreof the Same
Despite the muddle caused by the rankings, twoimportant aspects of the problem are nowclearer. First, the U.S. News rankings are here
to stay, though October now comes in late August
with the prerelease of the list of “Best Colleges.”
Autistic savant or not,U.S. News will continue to
go with the numbers—and the story those num-
bers tell will remain largely the same.
At the same time, calls for an alternative to the
U.S. News rankings will increase in both fre-
quency and fervor. Policy wonks and would-be
regulators intent on remaking higher education in
their own image will demand more transparency
and more testing in the name of making higher
education more accountable. Advocates for alter-
native learning paradigms will insist that more
robust measures of learning be included in the
rankings’ calculations. The most coherent and
perhaps most successful calls for developing co-
gent alternatives to the U.S. News rankings will
come from those like Lloyd Thacker of the Edu-
cational Conservancy and Doug Bennett, Earlham
College president and chair of the NSSE board,
1 In the fall of 2005, U.S. Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings
appointed a national Commission on the Future of Higher Education.
Charles Miller of Texas was its chair, and I joined 17 others drawn from
both within and without higher education as members. Despite the Com-
mission’s early promise, it delivered a report that failed to lead to mean-
ingful change within higher education.
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who want to make the conversation about what
constitutes a good college or university better re-
flect the educational values that ought to shape
the enterprise in the first place.
There ought to be calls as well to make rank-
ings and institutional evaluations more an exer-
cise in gauging customer satisfaction—more like
BusinessWeek’s rankings of business schools. Stu-
dents actually know better what they want and
need than the reformers and critics give them
credit for. Ask recent graduates what they thought
of the institutions they attended; ask them if they
are happy in the jobs they took following gradu-
ation; ask them how much money they are making
and to what extent they are actually using on the
job what they learned inside and outside the class-
room.
But moving from statistical measures of market
position to customer satisfaction will not be so
easy. BusinessWeek learned this lesson in 2006
when it sought to match its rankings of MBA
programs with a similarly constructed ranking of
undergraduate schools and business programs.
BusinessWeek wanted to deal with only a hundred
or so top undergraduate business programs and
actually settled for just 61 institutions for its in-
augural effort. In all, the magazine got valid e-mail
addresses from the colleges and universities them-
selves for just over 81,000 current business pro-
gram students. The problem was that only 19,550
students completed the online survey, a 24% re-
sponse rate. Most analysts think a 35% to 45%
response rate is necessary to draw the kind of
conclusions BusinessWeek wanted to draw. For its
MBA survey the response rate was 56%.
By comparison, developing a valid customer
satisfaction survey for colleges and universities
conferring baccalaureate degrees will prove a gar-
gantuan task involving some 1,800 institutions
and a sample of 900,000 potential respondents (at
500 students per institution). Best-guess estimates
run in the neighborhood of $8 million to $9
million per administration. It is unlikely that any
commercial venture—or even a foundation—
would risk that kind of funding, leaving the fed-
eral government and its Department of Education
as the only likely sponsors. Whether institutions
would trust the department not to misuse the
data is an open question, particularly given that
organization’s recent attempts to federalize the
accreditation process and its pushing of a national
student registry that would allow it to track indi-
vidual students regardless of how many different
institutions they attend.
If these security and political concerns can be
assuaged, however, the payoff would be consider-
able—particularly if the resulting survey contains
some NSSE-like items along with the bread-and-
butter satisfaction questions BusinessWeek asks of
the students in its survey. Initially, I suspect, most
consumers will stick with the market position
indicator championed by U.S. News, though in
time they too may begin to look at measures that
tell them something about the learning environ-
ments of the different institutions. The big win-
ners would be the faculty, once they got over the
notion that the survey’s results were just another
scorecard or ranking and began treating them as a
set of comparative diagnostic tools. The result just
might be a giant step toward creating the culture
of evidence the rankings were supposed to engen-
der in the first place.
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